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matter arises from a Commercial Lease and Deposit Receipt (hereinafter referred to
as "Commercial Lease") which was terminated by prior proceedings wherein the Watkins
Company, LLC (hereinafter referred to as "Watkins") was the landlord and the tenants were
Michael Storms, who died after trial, and thus, the Estate of Michael Storms was substituted in
his place, (hereinafter referred to as "Storms") and Brownstone Companies, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as "Brownstone"). Watkins initiated suit against Storms and Brownstone in
September 2010. 1 Trial was conducted in 2014, after which the trial court awarded Storms and
Brownstone $72,312.36 as attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 2 Watkins appeals from
the judgment, claiming the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Storms
and Brmvnstone.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter arises from a Commercial Lease which was initially litigated between the
parties in Watkins Co., LLC v. Storms, 152 Idaho 531,272 P.3d 503 (2012) and in which
Watkins Co., LLC was the landlord and Michael Storms and Brownstone were two of the
tenants. 3 The Commercial Lease was terminated in the original litigation on April 20, 2010, by

R. p. 2 and R. p.17

1

2R.

pp. 240-241

3R.

pp.17-24
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any agreement between it and Watkins, but paid rent to Watkins for a time, which rent was
accepted by Watkins during a period of time in which the parties attempted to reach a new
tenancy agreement. 5
Negotiations were unsuccessful and Watkins filed suit against Storms and Brownstone
Companies, Inc., on September 29, 2010, in a five count Complaint initially seeking a prejudgment writ of attachment, preliminary injunction, claiming a new lease had been created
between the parties, claiming that Storms and Brownstone had breached the new lease, claiming
damages of $976,975.85, seeking an order prohibiting Storms and Brownstone from removing
any property from the premises occupied by Storms and Brmvnstone, seeking an accounting for
additional rents that would be due, seeking eviction of Storms and Brownstone and requesting
attorney fees, in part, under the alleged newly created lease and Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 6
Watkins sought a prejudgment writ of attachment and initially obtained on September 29,
2010, a temporary restraining order prohibiting Storms and Brownstone from removing any
property from the premises until a decision was issued on Watkins' application for prejudgment
attachment. After several hearings, the court ultimately denied Watkins' request for a
prejudgment writ of attachment, but partially granted Watkins' request for a preliminary

4

R. p. 85

R. pp. 85-86

5

6R.

pp. 17-24
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The matter languished for roughly a year during which time Watkins took no action to
advance the case. On December 8, 2011, Watkins obtained permission to and thereafter filed an
Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint persisted in the same five counts originally
pleaded, and sought damages arising from a claimed breach of the original Commercial Lease
and the provisions pertaining to maintenance and repair of the premises; and unjust enrichment
for Storms/Brownstone's possession of the premises for the period during which the preliminary
injunction was in place and for a period of roughly 36 days for Storms and Brownstone to vacate
the premises after the prejudgment writ of attachment and preliminary injunction matters were
resolved. 8 Storms and Brownstone filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint on January 3,
2012. 9
From January of 2012, substantial discovery was undertaken by the parties, various
motions were filed and heard, including Motions for Summary Judgment which were denied in
part and granted in part. After obtaining leave of court in September of 2013, Watkins filed a
Second Amended Complaint restating the same five original counts despite the fact the court had
disposed of four of the five counts through summary judgment, retained the two additional
counts alleged in the Amended Complaint and added Count Eight, which sought damages for

7R.

pp. 88-90

8R.

pp. 27-37

R. p. 50

9
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were
date of the original Commercial Lease, July 31, 1996, until they were allowed to vacate the
premises on December 30, 2010. 10 Storms and Brownstone filed an Answer to the Second
Amended Complaint and Counterclaim on October 23, 2013. 11 After an additional Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Watkins and denied by the court, the matter proceeded to trial over
seven (7) days, commencing in March of 2014, and ending in July, 2014. 12
On November 19, 2014, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. Watkins was denied all relief under Count One (Breach of Contract claims); under Count
Two (injunctive relief); under Count Three (accounting); under Count Four (eviction); and under
Count Seven (unjust enrichment). Watkins recovered $699.64 under a combination of Count Six
(breach of contract maintenance and repair) and/or Count Eight (waste). Watkins had claimed
over $27,000.00 in repairs and maintenance and unjust enrichrnent. 13
On Storms and Brownstone's counterclaim, the court found and concluded that Storms
and Brownstone had shown themselves entitled to receive $17,015.88 in damages including
attorney fees and costs as a result of the wrongfully obtained injunction, but by reason of the
bond established by the court in the granting of the preliminary injunction, the recovery of

10

R. pp. 38-49

11

R. pp. 50-71

12

R. p. 78

13 R.

pp. 179-181
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$1

14

Storms and Brownstone timely filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, Memorandum
of Attorney Fees and Costs, and Affidavit in Support thereof detailing all costs and attorney fees
incurred in defending the complaint of Watkins and in prosecuting the counterclaim of Storms
and Brownstone. 15 No part of the attorney fees claimed were incurred as a result of Watkins'
claim for and Storms and Brownstone's defense to the initially-issued temporary restraining
order and application for prejudgment writ of attachment. 16 Watkins filed a Motion to Disallow
Costs and Attorney's Fees and a supporting Brief. Michael Storms passes away after the
application for attorney fees, but before the disposition thereof. His estate was substituted for him
and, after hearing, the court granted Storms and Brownstone attorney fees totaling $72,312.36
representing 90% of the claimed amount.17

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
l.

The Standard of Review is Abuse of Discretion.

2.

Watkins' assertion that Storms and Brownstone failed to segregate fees is raised
for the first time on appeal and should not be considered.

14 R.

pp.178 and 180

15 R.

pp. 185-205

16 R.

p. 233

17 R.

pp. 220-239
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The trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding Storms and
Brownstone attorneys fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
4.

Storms and Brown are entitled to recover attorney fees and costs on appeal
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and Idaho
Appellate Rules 40 and 41.

ARGUMENT
1.

The Standard of Review is Abuse of Discretion.
Awarding attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to

review for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 897, 104 P.3d 367,371 (2004).
When the Court on Appeal considers whether a trial court has abused its discretion, "the standard
is 'whether the court perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of
its discretion, and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason."' Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho
980, 342 P.3d 907, 911 (2015) and Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526,529,284 P.3d 970, 973
(2012) (quoting Read v. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 369, 209 P.3d 661,666 (2009)).

2.

Watkins' assertion that Storms and Brownstone failed to segregate fees is raised for
the first time on appeal and should not be considered.
Watkins' argument of segregation should not be considered by the court on appeal, as it

was not raised before the trial court. It is clear in Idaho law that an issue raised for the first time
on appeal will not be considered. In Fagen, Inc. v. Rogerson Flats Wind Park, LLC, 159 Idaho
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1
them contended that the district court erred "by deeming as reasonable the rates of Minnesota
counsel (vastly higher than those in the rural Idaho market)," which they asserted made the award
disproportionally greater than reasonable when compared to similar cases. The court noted, "In
their objection to the attorney fees claimed, Defendants did not state with particularity that they
were objecting to the hourly rate claimed by Plaintiff's Minnesota counsel. That is an issue raised
for the first time on appeal. Therefore, we will not consider it." Id. at 1193.
In Tapadeera, LLCv. Knowlton, 153 Idaho 182,188,280 P.3d 685,691 (2012) the
Respondent, on its cross-appeal, contended that the district court erred in failing to award
attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(1). The court on appeal held "Tapadeera did not ask
the district court for an award of attorney fees under that statute. This Court will not consider
issues raised for the first time on appeal." Id. at 691 (2012). Likewise, in Inland Grp. of

Companies, Inc. v. Obendorjf, 131 Idaho 473, 959 P.2d 454, (1998), Inland argued that the
affidavit in support of a motion for order to show cause was defective because Obendorff did not
state that he had personal knowledge of his office billing procedures or how the bill was
computed. The court on appeal stated, "This is just a backdoor attempt by Inland to attack the
amount of the fees on appeal. The issue in the contempt proceeding was Inland's failure to pay
the special master's fees, not the amount of the fees. There is nothing in the record to indicate that
Inland had previously objected to the amount of the fees and, thus, we will not consider this issue
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on

at

The trial court entered Judgment in which Watkins would recover nothing on its breach
of new lease claims, Watkins was denied all relief except for $699 .64 of the more than one
million in damages sought, and that Storms and Brownstone would recover $10,000.00 of the
$17,015.88 damages that had been established. On December 3, 2014, Storms and Brownstone
timely filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs,
and an Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs. 18
In response to Storms and Brownstone's motion for attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12120(3), Watkins filed a Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees on December 23, 2014. 19
The Motion asserted that 1) Storms and Brownstone were not the prevailing parties; 2) Any
award of costs and fees may have been affected by a pending Motion to Alter or Amend; and that
3) As a matter oflaw, Storms and Brownstone could not recover anything. On December 27,
2014, Watkins also filed a Brief in Support of Motion to Disallow Cost and Attorney Fees. The
Brief asserted the following:
II.

The court should disallow all of Storms and Brownstone's Costs and Attorney Fee
because their total recovery is limited to the amount of the security bond; 20

III.

The court should disallow all of Storms and Brownstone's Costs and Attorney

18 R.

pp. 240-241

19

R. pp. 206-207

20

R. p. 210
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are
IV.

The court should reduce the any award to Storms and Brownstone based on the
requirements and consideration of Rule 54. 22

Rule 7(b)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a Motion to Disallow
attorney fees and costs must state with particularity the grounds for the relief sought In its
objection to the attorney fees claimed, Watkins did not state with particularity that it was
objecting to Storms and Brownstone's failure to segregate those fees that are recoverable from
those that are not recoverable.23 At no time at the trial court level did Watkins cite to Brooks v.

Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72 (1996), wherein the district court denied Gigray Ranches'
request for attorney fees based upon the conclusion that its defense of the breach of contract
action was inseparably intertwined with and at least partially attributable to the intentional tort
claim for conversion-which was outside the scope of §1

120(3). Id. No argument was

advanced that the trial court should deny all of the fees requested by Storms and Brownstone
because it was impossible to distinguish between attorney fees incurred in defending against the
breach of contract claims and those incurred in prosecuting Storms and Bro~11stone's
counterclaim for damages caused by the wrongfully issued temporary restraining order. The
words now found in bold in Appellant's Brief: "insufficient to isolate the fees", "must
apportion", "meaningful segregation", "not apportioned", "does not isolate fees", and "separate

21 R.
22

p. 213

R. p. 217

23 R.

pp. 206-218
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never

or

to

24

never

by Watkins. Instead, Watkins waited until filing its appeal and its Appellant's Brief to make the
argument, raise the issue, and use the words.
If, for some reason, the court considers the argument of segregation, in addition to the
sums which Watkins admits are attributable to the defense of Watkins' claim, clearly the court
can award the $21,825.00 in attorney fees that were incurred after the temporary injunction and
prejudgment writ of attachment issues were resolved on December 1, 2010, and prior to Storms
and Brownstone even filing the counterclaim on October 23, 2013, more than three years after
the commencement of the lawsuit by Watkins against Storms and Brownstone. 25 The court also
should remand to allow Storms and Brownstone the ability to address Watkins claims that were
made for the first time on appeal.

3.

The trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding Storms and
Brownstone attorneys fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
The trial court in this matter determined that Storms and Brownstone were entitled to

recover their attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 1 120(3) as the prevailing parties in
litigation involving a commercial transaction. Watkins does not allege error in that
determination. Watkins merely objects to the manner by which the court applied the factors of
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l) in determining amount of the attorney fees awarded. The calculation of

24 R.

pp. 206-218

25 R.

pp. 190-201
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lS

Authority, 128 Idaho 580,

917 P .2d 73 7, 749 (1996). Watkins, as the party opposing the

award made herein, has the burden to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion.

Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402,412, 987 P.2d 314, 324
(1999).
In awarding reasonable attorney fees, the trial court identified that it considered the
factors of l.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(3). The trial court further cited In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr.

Project, 146 Idaho 527, 544, 199 P.3d 102, 119 (2008) for the rule that although the court must
consider the factors listed in Rule 54( e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure when
determining the amount to award in attorney fees, the court need not demonstrate how it
employed any of the factors in reaching an award amount. 26 The court need not specifically
address each of the factors, as long as the record indicates that it considered them all. 27 Id. at
527. The trial court thereafter conducted an analysis regarding the award of attorney fees over
and above the amount of the bond. The trial court identified various factors it considered,
including: the demands and recovery of each party and the percentage of recovery on the various
claims; the court's knowledge of the pleadings and issues tried in the matter; the witnesses
testimony, and evidence admitted at trial; and the court's analysis of the various claims of the

26

R. p. 230

27

R. p. 231
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The trial court determined that Storms and Brownstone were entitled to recover 90% of
the attorneys fees sought based upon its analyses. The bottom line in an award of attorney fees is
reasonableness. Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 86 P.3d
475 (2004). The burden is on the party opposing the award to demonstrate that the district court
abused its discretion." Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749, 185 P.3d 258,261 (2008). For
purposes of its appeal, Watkins chose not to request a transcript. No request was made for a
transcript of any portion of the trial testimony that covered seven days, or any argument
presented in any of the ten hearings held in the matter. The Clerk's record submitted for
purposes of appeal is comprised of only the bare minimum. Watkins provides the Court with no
facts with which to determine that the ten percent of attorneys fees not awarded was
unreasonable, nor that the 90% of fees that were awarded was unreasonable.
At the trial court, Watkins made no specific objection to any fee charged except a claim
that $720.00 of the fees were not itemized and 30 hours ohime that was not billed to Storms and
Brownstone. Both specific objections were dismissed by the trial court. 29 Watkins made no
objection to the specific attorney fee incurred or claimed. Before the trial court, no claim was
made the any entry was vague or too generic to provide any meaningful information as to what

work was done.
28 R.

pp. 233-237

29 R.

pp. 217,218 and235
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court
based upon

an

court's own knowledge and experience is not foreign. In determining the

reasonableness of the fees, the trial court can certainly utilize its own knowledge and experience
and further is free to use the record in the case. Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas
Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 769, 86 P.3d 475,483 (2004) and Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145
Idaho 746, 751, 185 P.3d 258,263 (2008) The appellant bears the burden of showing a manifest
abuse of discretion and the court on appeal cannot assume from the absence of specific writings
that there was a manifest abuse. Manifest abuse of discretion must be clearly demonstrated by the
party making the claim. Most importantly, this means the amount granted must be shown to be
clearly erroneous. Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 351, 766 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1988)
Here, the trial court also identified that Storms and Brownstone were found entitiled to
recover 81 % of what they had requested on their counterclaim, but only recovered 4 7% of that
which they had requested on their counterclaim, as a result of the $10,000.00 bond. The court
further noted that Storms and Brownstone had prevailed on over 97% of Watkins' claims against
them. 30
An award of attorney fees may be based upon a percent by which a party prevailed in
prosecuting a counterclaim and in successfully defending claims. The court in Freeman & Co. v.
Bolt, 132 Idaho 152, 162,968 P.2d 247,257 (Ct. App. 1998) approved of the trial court awarding

30 R.

p. 234
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claim for money allegedly

on a contract for construction of house, and in pursuing their

counterclaim for alleged construction defects; the trial court conducted a careful twelve-page
analysis and concluded that the owners were clearly the prevailing party but that contractor
prevailed on about 30% of his contested claims. Id. at 162.
The trial court in this mater perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion, consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. The award of 90% of
Storms and Brownstone's attorney fees is reasonable. Certainly, Watkins points to no part of the
trial court's observations as erroneous under the record. The award of $72,312.35 should be
affirmed.

4.

Storms and Brown are entitled to recover attorney fees and costs on appeal under
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and Idaho Appellate
Rules 40 and 41.
Rule 4l(a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules requires that Stroms and BrO\vnstone assert a

claim for attorney fees as an issue presented on appeal. Storms and Brownstone seek and award
of attorney fees and costs and are entitled to recovery of the same. When a party prevails at both
trial and on appeal, and that party received an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section
12-120(3) at the trial level and the award is affirmed on appeal, that party is also entitled to an
award of attorney fees for the appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3). Idaho Transp.
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8,

V.

Engineers. Inc., 141 Idaho 415,424, 111 P.3d 100, 109 (2005), Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule 41.

Should Storms and Brownstone prevail on appeal, they are entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
The prevailing party on appeal is allowed costs as a matter course unless otherwise
provided by law pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40. Should Storms and Brownstone prevail on
appeal they are also entitled to an award of costs.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the award of attorney fees as both
reasonable and being a product of the appropriate exercise of discretion. The Court should not
consider the issues associated with segregation of Storms and Brownstone' attorney fees which is
raised by Watkins for the first time on appeal. Alternately, the court could easily sustain
$22,320.00 in fees that can be allocated and remand

further determination to allow Storms

and Brownstone the ability to respond to newly raised issues. Finally, Storms and Burgraff
should recover their attorney fees and costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this)flftay of June, 2016.

Attorney for Respondents
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CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with

office in

Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the ~=- day of June, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document on the person or persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered as defined by Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P.
B.J. Driscoll, Esq.
Smith, Driscoll and Associates
414 Shoup
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls ID 83405

[ ]

[Xf
[ J
[ ]

By pre-paid post
By hand delivery
By facsimile transmission
By Courthouse box

DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ.
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